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NOTES
McNally v. United States: Mail Fraud-The Procrustean Bed
Couldn't Stretch This One*
In 1974, the Governor of Kentucky gave Howard P. "Sonny" Hunt,
head of the state Democratic Party, de facto control over selecting
insurance agencies from which the state would purchase its insurance
policies. The Wombwell Insurance Company of Kentucky and Hunt
worked out an agreement whereby Wombwell would direct any com-
missions it received over $50,000 a year to other insurance agencies
designated by Hunt in exchange for being the state's exclusive agent.
Over the next four years, Hunt directed Wombwell to give $851,000
in commissions to twenty-one insurance agencies that he had picked.
Seton Investments, Inc. (Seton), a company that Hunt and James E.
Gray had established for the purpose of acquiring these commissions
and in which Charles J. McNally had an ownership interest, received
$200,000 of these commissions.
Hunt, Gray, and McNally were prosecuted under the federal mail
fraud statute.' Gray and McNally were convicted, 2 and the court of
appeals affirmed under the theory that the mail fraud statute proscribes
schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and
impartial government. 3 The United States Supreme Court reversed, hold-
* Donald V. Morano referred to the mail fraud statute as a procrustean bed in
his article The Mail-Fraud Statute: A Procrustean Bed, 14 J. Marshall L. Rev. 45, 47
n.3 (1980). He explains:
In Greek mythology, Procrustes invited travelers to spend the night as his guests.
Procrustes was, however, far from an ideal host. Once he had succeeded in
overpowering his unsuspecting guest, he forced him to lie on an iron bed and
then robbed him. But worse than the robbery was Procrustes' practice of either
stretching out or lopping off the legs of his victims to make their bodies conform
to the length of the bed.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1984) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false br fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give
away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit
or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article . .. for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do [and uses the mails]
... shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
2. Hunt eventually pled guilty to mail and tax fraud and received a three year
sentence.
3. United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. McNally
v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
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ing that the mail fraud statute is limited to schemes involving deprivation
of money or property rights. 4 McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct.
2875 (1987).
The purpose of this note is to assess the impact the decision will
have on determining what conduct will fall within the purview of the
mail fraud statute. The Court partially overruled a doctrine created by
the lower federal courts, commonly referred to as "the intangible rights
doctrine." But an examination of McNally, the traditional meaning of
fraud, and the development of the intangible rights doctrine will reveal
that the scope of the mail fraud statute is left relatively intact.
McNally v. United States
The McNally Court held that the jury charge improperly permitted
a conviction for conduct not within the reach of the mail fraud statute,
because there was no charge that required the jury to find that the
Commonwealth was defrauded of any money or property. Although the
issue in McNally did not specifically address whether the alleged conduct
of the defendants was within the scope of the mail fraud statute,
substantive analysis of the statute is required to properly assess the
propriety of the jury charge.
To fall within the purview of the statute, there must be a transfer
of something of economic value from the victim to the defrauder. In
addition, there must be deception of the victim or a breach of a fiduciary
duty owed to him. The transfer of funds involved in McNally was from
the Commonwealth to the insurance company. The insurance company
then paid the agency, who in turn paid the defendants. If the Com-
monwealth is considered the victim, there must be a finding of a dep-
rivation of money or property resulting from a deception practiced upon
or a breach of duty owed to the Commonwealth, findings which the
Court was not willing to make. If the insurance agency is considered
the victim, there must be a finding of deception or breach as to the
agency which resulted in a transfer of money or property; such allegations
were not timely made.
Justice White began the Court's analysis by stating that "[tihe mail
fraud statute clearly protects property rights, but does not refer to the
intangible right of the citizenry to good government." 5 The meaning of
"protecting property rights" will be the focus of this article.
4. Justice White delivered the opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Scalia joined. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined in all except part IV.
5. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2879 (1987).
[Vol. 48
NOTES
The opinion begins with a brief look at legislative history. The
legislation forming the basis for the current mail fraud statute was
enacted in 1872.6 The statute prohibited "any scheme or artifice to
defraud ' 7 but did not contain the current language which extends the
prohibition to schemes to obtain "money or property by means of false
or fraudulent prentenses." The sponsor of the original legislation stated
that it was needed "to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up
in the large cities ... by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally,
for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the
country." 9 Congress amended the statute in 1889 by adding prohibitions
against counterfeiting schemes.10 The last significant amendment, in 1909,
added the phrase "or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.""
Although the statute initially prohibited "any scheme or artifice to
defraud," the Supreme Court in McNally relied upon legislative history
to state that the mail fraud statute originally contemplated deprivation
of money or property.' 2 The Court further recognized that the lower
courts have read the 1909 amendment not as limiting the original phrase
"scheme or artifice to defraud," but rather as creating a separate crime
under the mail fraud statute. 3 Rejecting such an interpretation, the
Court found that the 1909 amendment expanded the statute to encompass
misrepresentations as to the future, 4 concluding that such a finding was
a codification 5 of Durland v. United States, 6 which denied the appli-
cation of a common law defense to the mail fraud statute. The Court
noted that Durland proposed that the phrase "any scheme or artifice
to defraud" was "to be interpreted broadly insofar as property rights
are concerned, but did not indicate that the statute had a more extensive
reach." 17
6. Id. at 2879. The statute was first enacted as § 301 of the Act of June 8, 1872.
Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-Corruption Prosecutions Under
the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 562, 567 (1980).
7. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879.
8. Id. at 2880. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1984).
9. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879 (quoting Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35
(1870)).
10. Id. at 2880 n.6.
11. Id. at 2880.
12. Id. at 2879.
13. Id. at 2880.
14. Id. at 2881.
15. Id. at 2880.
16. 161 U.S. 306, 16 S. Ct. 508 (1896). Durland has often been cited for the
proposition that the mail fraud statute is to be broadly construed.
17. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879-80.
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The McNally Court defined "to defraud" as "'wronging one in his
property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,"' and stated that the
term 'usually signif[ies] the deprivation of something of value by trick,
deceit, chicane or overreaching."" 8 The Court noted that "[t]he codi-
fication of the holding in Durland in 1909 does not indicate that Congress
was departing from this common understanding."'' 9
The Court concluded its analysis by stating that when there are two
rational readings of a criminal statute, the harsher reading should be
chosen only when congressional intent is clear; thus, the statute's scope
should be limited to the protection of property rights. 20
Applying substantive analysis to an examination of the jury charge,
the Court stated: "It was not charged that in the absence of the alleged
scheme the Commonwealth would have paid a lower premium or secured
better insurance." '2' This suggests that had the jury been charged with
either instruction and found the defendants guilty, the conviction would
have been proper, either because the state paid more in commissions
or because it was deprived of better insurance.
The Court further stated, "Nor was the jury charged that to convict
it must find that the Commonwealth was deprived of control over how
its money was spent."" In a footnote, the Court stated that there should
be no assumption of a state law violation based solely upon Hunt's
insistence that the commissions be shared, Hunt and Gray's ownership
of one of the agencies receiving the commissions, and Hunt and Gray's
failure to report their sharing in the commissions to state officials. 23
The Commonwealth had to obtain insurance and pay the premiums
regardless of the source from which the insurance was obtained. Since
the Commonwealth did not specify who could receive the commissions
from the premiums, the Commonwealth was not deprived of any control.
The Court noted that Congress could make this activity illegal re-
gardless of what state law provides, but if the state law is silent or
allows the activity, "it would take a much clearer indication than the
mail fraud statute evidences to convince us that having and concealing
such an interest defrauds the State and is forbidden under federal law." '2 4
The Court simply said that the Commonwealth had chosen not to exercise
any control over the commissions paid by the insurance company to its
18. Id. at 2880-81 (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188, 44
S. Ct. 511, 512 (1924)).
19. Id. at 2881.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2875, 2882.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2882 n.9.
24. Id.
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agent. Therefore, Hunt and Gray were free to exert control over the
commissions paid to Wombwell to benefit other agencies as well as
themselves. The language used by the Court suggests that, had the
Commonwealth decided to regulate the payment of commissions, then
Hunt and Gray could have been convicted for depriving the Common-
wealth of that control. 25
Justice Stevens is convinced that under the majority opinion, a
conviction for mail fraud now requires a showing that one has schemed
to defraud his victim by seeking to obtain money or property and has
also caused an intangible loss. 26 However, a close reading of the majority
decision discloses no reference to monetary or property loss. The Court
used the term "money or property right"; thus, the decision only elim-
inates from the scope of the mail fraud statute those intangible rights
in which there is no proprietary interest. McNally does not define
property rights; however, in light of the history of the mail fraud statute,
its close parallel to the crime of false pretenses, and the Court's definition
of fraud, property rights implicitly have a traditional definition found
in most fraud and theft statutes. Thus, if the mail fraud statute is
interpreted as a traditional fraudulent crime, a large body of law exists
to define "property right."
Traditional Fraud
Common law larceny is defined as "the trespassory (actual or con-
structive) taking and carrying away of the personal property of another
with the intent to permanently deprive." '27 Larceny is a possessory crime
and not one against ownership. 21 If ownership does pass, no larceny
has been committed. 29 In order for property to be the subject of larceny,
it must have some value and be capable of being carried away from
the owner.30 Thus, real property cannot be the subject of larceny.3
Traditionally, a person's services could not be the subject of larceny as
there could be no carrying away from the owner. 32 Water, oil, gas, and
electricity have all been found to be proper subjects of larceny only
25. The government did try to argue that Hunt and Gray interfered with Wombwell's
right to the money by falsely representing themselves to Wombwell. The court dismissed
this as it was not alleged in the jury charge. Id. at 2882.
26. Id. at 2882, 2884 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor joined in all but
Part IV of the dissent.
27. 3 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 354 (14th ed. 1980).
28. M. Bassiouni, Substantive Criminal Law 306 (1978).
29. 2 J. Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law § 813 (5th ed. 1872).
30. W. Clark & W. Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes § 12.01, 804 (7th
ed. 1967).
31. See id. § 12.02, at 813.
32. M. Bassiouni, supra note 28, at 312.
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when they are placed in pipes, storage tanks, and electric lines, for in
that capacity they can be taken and carried away from the owner."
The property must have some value, however slight. Even a piece of
paper is sufficient. However, if the paper represents some right, such
as a promissory note, then it may not be the subject of larceny, as it
is thought to have lost its identity as paper.3 4
Where the property is taken by some misrepresentation or fraud it
is not larceny, because the owner has consented to the taking.35 Pos-
session is transferred as a consequence of gaining ownership. 6 The
common law concept of cheat was created to cover such a transfer.
Cheat is defined as "fraud, accomplished through the instrumentality
of some false symbol or token, of a nature against which common
prudence cannot guard, to the injury of one in his property or estate. ' ' 37
The common law cheat is distinguished from common law larceny in
that the cheat requires the use of a symbol or token and ownership
must pass.3 9
Neither common law cheat nor common law larceny encompassed
fraudulent conveyances in which no token or symbol was used. Justice
Jackson wrote in Morissette v. United States:4° "What has concerned
codifiers of the larceny-type offense is that gaps or crevices have sep-
arated particular crimes of this general class and guilty men have escaped
through the breaches."' ' Early Anglo-American statutes and refinements
in the common law created the crimes of embezzlement and obtaining
property by false pretenses to help fill this gap. 42
The crime of false pretenses is not recognized at common law. 43 It
developed to regulate wrongful transactions not covered by common law
larceny. The crime of false pretenses was typically defined as "the
obtaining, with intent to defraud, of title to and possession of another's
property, by means of a false representation."" The intentions of both
the owner and the defendant were considered. If the owner did not
intend for ownership to pass, there could be no crime of false pretenses.4 5
33. W. Clark & W. Marshall, supra note 30, § 12.01 at 804.
34. J. Miller, Handbook of Criminal Law § 110, 344 (1934).
35. 2 J. Bishop, supra note 29, at § 811.
36. M. Bassiouni, supra note 28, at § 307.
37. 2 J. Bishop, supra note 29, at § 143.
38. Id. at § 144.
39. Id. at § 166.
40. 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240 (1952).
41. Id. at 271, 72 S. Ct. at 254.
42. 3 C. Torcia, supra note 27, at § 355.
43. Id. at § 422.
44. Id. at § 423.
45. W. Clark & W. Marshall, supra note 30, § 12.23, at 925.
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All property that is included in common law larceny is included in
the crime of false pretenses; 46 however, a broader class of property is
subject to the crime of false pretenses. False pretenses statutes have
extended protection to real property, paper representing anything of
value, evidence of debt, labor or services, money, goods, chattels, and
other valuable security.4 7 Although the property must have some value, 4
there need not be an actual pecuniary loss to the victim. 49 Traditionally,
American and English courts have required the transfer of something
of economic value and have not required that there be an actual loss
to the victim. 0
For example, in Commonwealth v. Stovall" the court held that
larceny by false pretenses had been committed where the defendant had
obtained a loan by falsely representing that he owned a company which
needed to meet its payroll. The possibility for repayment of the loan
was irrelevant.
In United States v. Rowe, 52 the court held that no loss to the victim
need be shown to convict a defrauder. Judge Learned Hand wrote:
A man is none the less cheated out of his property, when he
is induced to part with it by fraud, because he gets a quid pro
quo of equal value. It may be impossible to measure his loss
by the gross scales available to a court, but he has suffered a
wrong; he has lost his chance to bargain with the facts before
him. That is the evil against which the statute is directed."
The court was interpreting 18 United States Code section 338, the mail
fraud statute.14 Other federal courts interpreting the mail fraud statute
prior to the intangible rights doctrine consistently have held the same.
In Whitson v. United States," the court found that a scheme whereby
the defendant contracted with a church to solicit donations in return
for the receipt of 75076 of the donations was within the mail fraud
statute. As part of the agreement, the church could not solicit donations.
The court found the contract to be property within the scope of the
mail fraud statute. The focus of the court's analysis was not whether
46. Id. at 926.
47. Id. See also 3 C. Torcia, supra note 27, at § 444.
48. 3 C. Torcia, supra note 27, at § 445.
49. See id. at § 442.
50. Comment, supra note 6, at 572-78. The author gives an excellent discussion of
early American and English cases imposing the economic requirement.
51. 22 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 498 N.E.2d 126 (1986).
52. 56 F.2d 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 554, 52 S. Ct. 579 (1932).
53. Id. at 749.
54. See U.S.C. Tables 30 (1982).
55. 122 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1941).
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the victim actually lost something of value, but rather that something
of value had been transferred because of a false representation.
Adjmi v. United States56 similarly held that there need not be a loss
to the victim. The court found that where the defendant's property had
burned and he had mailed inflated repair estimates to the insurance
company, a mail fraud conviction was proper even though the insurance
company may have paid only the actual value of the property, and thus
suffered no loss.
In United States v. Groves,17 the court found that a common law
deceit had been committed where the president of a corporation failed
to disclose his interest in a scheme which ultimately profited the pres-
ident. Based upon the president's advice, the company repurchased its
own stock from an individual at a much higher price than the individual
had paid. The president had received a share of the profits. The court's
analysis emphasized the transfer of something of economic value based
upon the president's breach of his fiduciary duty; the opinion stated
that there need not be a loss to the victim. 8
As the aforementioned cases reflect, the mail fraud statute is anal-
ogous to the crime of false pretenses: both generally proscribe fraudulent
transactions involving property capable of pecuniary valuation, yet nei-
ther requires the finding of pecuniary loss to the victim. Recently, the
crime of false pretenses has been grouped with other fraudulent crimes
under the heading of theft.
The Modern View
Increasingly, jurisdictions are consolidating larceny and theft-type
offenses (such as embezzlement, false pretenses, extortion, blackmail and
fraudulent conversions) under one theft statute. 9 For example, the Model
Penal Code6° defines "property" as "anything of value, including real
estate, tangible and intangible personal property, contract rights, choses-
in-action and other interests in or claims to wealth, admission or trans-
portation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food and drink, electric
or other power. ' 61 The provision encompasses all property that has been
the subject of common law larceny, common law cheats, and false
56. 346 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 823, 86 S. Ct. 73 (1965).
57. 122 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 670, 62 S. Ct. 135 (1941).
58. See also Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 574, 61 S. Ct. 1085 (1941), and infra text accompanying notes 71-75.
59. 3 C. Torcia, supra note 47, at § 394.
60. Model Penal Code § 223.0, note on status of section (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
61. See id. at § 223.0(6).
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pretenses. Additionally, the Code defines "obtain" to mean "to bring
about a transfer or purported transfer of a legal interest in the prop-
erty." 62
The McNally Court treats the mail fraud statute as a traditional
crime of fraud when it defines "to defraud" as "wronging one in his
property rights by dishonest methods or schemes." Because most modern
theft statutes consolidate theft and the traditional fraudulent crimes into
one statute, the "property" that would sustain a conviction under the
modern theft statutes should be "property" covered by the mail fraud
statute as well. Before McNally, some lower federal courts allowed the
prosecution to obtain convictions based solely on the theory that the
victim had been deprived of an intangible right, regardless of whether
that right had any economic value. Such convictions extended the mail
fraud statute beyond the scope of traditional fraud.
The Development of the Intangible Rights Doctrine
The mail fraud statute was enacted under Congress' power to regulate
the postal system, orignially necessitating a much stronger connection
between the scheme and the use of the mails than is currently required.
Employment of the statute has enabled federal prosecutors to regulate
activity traditionally controlled by the states. Thus, the statute has been
used to obtain convictions for vote-fraud schemes, 63 kickback schemes,6
political corruption, 65 and even divorce mills.6
Before McNally, a conviction could be obtained under the mail
fraud statute under two theories. The first theory involved the traditional
scheme to obtain from the victim some economic interest, that is, money
or property, through fraud. A second theory, developed by the lower
federal courts, involved a conviction based upon a scheme to deprive
the victim of only an intangible, noneconomic right; under this theory,
some fiduciary relationship between the "schemer" and the victim was
needed. Public officials have a fiduciary relationship with their citizens
and owe them proper and impartial government. 67 Similarly, private
62. See id. at § 223.0(5).
63. United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909,
94 S. Ct. 2605 (1974).
64. United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827, 94
S. Ct. 49 (1973).
65. United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
976, 96 S. Ct. 1481 (1976). See also, United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S. Ct. 3183 (1974).
66. United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891,
93 S. Ct. 118 (1972).
67. States, 488 F.2d at 766.
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employees owe their employers honest and faithful services. 6s When the
fiduciary relationship is breached, the victim is said to have been deprived
of one of these intangible rights, violating the mail fraud statute. The
theory has commonly become known as "the intangible rights doctrine"
or "fiduciary fraud." '69
In applying the intangible rights doctrine, the courts have generally
relied upon two cases to support the move away from an economic
requirement. 70 The first case, Shushan v. United States,7 involved a
group of defendants charged with "having devised a scheme to defraud,
and ... obtaining money and property by false and fraudulent pretenses
from the Board of Levee Commissioners of Orleans Levee District. ' 72
Abraham Shushan, who was a former member of the Board, schemed
with four others to contract with the Board to refinance five and a
half million dollars in outstanding Board bonds. Because of a change
in interest rates, the Board would profit by repurchasing its outstanding
bonds and issuing new ones at a lower rate. The scheme succeeded, and
the defendants eventually received their fee in the form of 25% of the
savings that resulted from the refunding-an exorbitant amount for the
services rendered. One of the defendants, a member of the Board, was
to receive a portion of the fee as a bribe, and in return he was to use
his influence to sway the other Board members to accept the refinancing
contract.
The Fifth Circuit found that a scheme to defraud existed because
the potential savings under the refinancing plan were falsely represented. 73
The fact that the Board actually made money out of the transaction
was no defense. The court stated:
68. George, 477 F.2d at 512-13.
69. Comment, supra note 6, at 578-84. Fraud, as it has traditionally been understood,
requires the transfer of something of economic value, though no loss to the victim need
occur. See supra text accompanying notes 27-62. For Federal cases imposing an economic
requirement upon application of the mail fraud statute, see Adjmi v. United States, 346
F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 823, 86 S. Ct. 73 (1965); Whitson v. United
States, 122 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1941); United States v. Groves, 122 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 670, 62 S. Ct. 135 (1941); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d
110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574, 61 S. Ct. 1085 (1941); United States v. Rowe,
56 F.2d 1747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 554, 52 S. Ct. 579 (1932); and United
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1942).
70. Comment, supra note 6, at 584. See also, United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d
1347, 1362 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961, 100 S. Ct. 1647 (1980); United
States v. lsaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S. Ct.
3183 (1974); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 909, 94 S. Ct. 2605 (1974); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 513 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827, 94 S. Ct. 49 (1973).
71. 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574, 61 S. Ct. 1085 (1941).
72. Id. at 114.
73. Id. at 115.
[Vol. 48
NOTES
That potential profit, all of it, was the property of the Board.
These defendants had no original right to any of it. They could
get no share except by some arrangement with the Board ....
[T]he defendants .,. . received cash .... This cash unquestion-
ably was the money of the Board.
74
The important thing to note is that there was a transfer of something
tangible to the defendants. There may not have been a "loss," but
there was a deprivation of property because the commissions were ob-
tained through fraud. The mail fraud statute was violated because there
was deception accompanied by a transfer of something of economic
value.
The Shushan opinion further stated that "there may be a scheme
to defraud by other means than express false representations." The court
explained:
A scheme to get money unfairly by obtaining and then betraying
the confidence of another . . . would be a scheme to defraud
though no lies were told. A scheme to get a public contract on
more favorable terms than would likely be got otherwise by
bribing a public official would . . . be a scheme to defraud the
public .... No trustee has more sacred duties than a public
official and any scheme to obtain an advantage by corrupting
such an [sic] one must in the federal law be considered a scheme
to defraud.
7
1
Various courts of appeals have cited Shushan as support for the intan-
gible rights doctrine, relying on the aforementioned passage. 76 They have
relied on Shushan to support convictions under the mail fraud statute
when the victim has been deceived by the breach of a fiduciary duty,
reasoning that the victim need only be deprived of an intangible right.
While Shushan does support the fiduciary aspect of the theory, it hardly
supports the contention that a scheme to defraud can exist absent
deprivation of property capable of pecuniary value.
The second case which the lower courts relied upon to support the
intangible rights doctrine, United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
77
involved a scheme where Procter & Gamble paid an employee of a
competitor for the competitor's products, formulas, and other trade
74. Id. at 119.
75. Id. at 115.
76. See United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 909, 94 S. Ct. 2605 (1974); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1362 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961, 100 S. Ct. 1647 (1980); United States v. Isaacs, 493
F.2d 1124, 1150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S. Ct. 3183 (1974).
77. 47 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1942).
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secrets. The defendants contended that the mail fraud statute only cov-
ered schemes which deprived the "victim of his goods through actionable
deceit practised [sic] upon him." '78 The court held that the mail fraud
statute must be given broad meaning, concluding that fraud refers to
a gain of an undue advantage by false representations or by an act
which is in violation of some positive duty. 79 The court, relying upon
Shushan, 0 said that there need be no "actionable deceit" or false
representations, but only a violation of a fiduciary duty. The court did
not discard the requirement that property or money be taken. In fact,
the court stated that trade secrets and property were obtained."1
The intangible rights theory was formed from the idea of proving
fraud (i.e., deception) by showing a violation of a fiduciary duty. Since
deception could be shown by fiduciary violations, the only remaining
obstacle to the formation of the intangible rights theory was the elim-
ination of the economic requirement.
In United States v. States,8 2 the Eighth Circuit relied upon Shushan
to support the intangible rights doctrine and the elimination of the
economic requirement in mail fraud convictions. The court addressed
the issue of whether the mail fraud statute covered the actions of a
candidate for office and his cohorts who attempted to mail in absentee
ballots of nonexistent voters in order to boost electoral support. The
defendants argued that money or property must be involved in those
schemes within the scope of the mail fraud statute.
The court rejected this argument, reasoning that when the mail fraud
statute was originally enacted it only covered a "scheme or artifice to
defraud." 3 The court held that the 1909 amendment introduced an
independent phrase to the statute; therefore, only a fraudulent scheme
need be shown to satisfy the original language. 4 Since fraud can be
shown by breach of a fiduciary duty, such conduct constitutes mail
fraud.
McNally narrowed the scope of the intangible rights doctrine; how-
ever, its implications are not as far reaching as some would suggest.8 5
78. Id. at 678.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S. Ct. 2605 (1974).
83. Id. at 763-64.
84. Id. at 764. As the author of the Comment, supra note 6, at 571, suggests, if
the amendment created a new crime it would have been unnecessary, as the mail fraud
statute had been used before the amendment in crimes against property.
85. See Justice Stevens' dissent in McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2882
(1987).
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The court did not eliminate the intangible rights doctrine completely,
but only limited its use to cases where there has been a transfer of
something of economic value. The Court has returned us to the law as
it existed prior to cases such as States.
IMPLICATIONS
Seven days after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the McNally
case8 6 the Court granted certiorari to hear Carpenter v. United States. 7
The Carpenter case, which clarifies McNally, was not decided until almost
five months after McNally.
Carpenter, which holds that the violation of a fiduciary duty still
constitutes fraud, clarifies the meaning of "property right." Carpenter
involved a Wall Street Journal reporter, R. Foster Winans, who helped
write a daily column, "Heard on the Street," which discussed selected
stocks, The Court found that because of the perceived quality of the
column, the publication had the potential to affect the prices of the
stocks examined by the column. The Journal's policy was that contents
of the column were the Journal's confidential information prior to
publication.
Winans conspired with other defendants to provide information in
the column prior to its publication. Based on this information, trades
were made resulting in net profits of $690,000, which were split among
the defendants. The Court found that The Wall Street Journal was
deprived of the intangible right to confidential business information by
an employee who breached a fiduciary duty to his employer, even though
the victim did not suffer any actual loss.
The Court found that Winans "knowingly breached a duty of con-
fidentiality by misappropriating prepublication information . . . that had
been gained in the course of his employment under the understanding
that it would not be revealed in advance of publication and that if it
were, he would report it to his employer. 8
The defendants contended that this was not a scheme to defraud
within the meaning of the mail fraud statute, and that even if it was,
they did not obtain any money or property as required by McNally.
The Court stated that the deprivation of the Journal's right to honest
and faithful services was "an interest too ethereal in itself to fall within
the protection of the mail fraud statute." 9
86. Centiorari was granted on Dec. 8, 1986. 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986).
87. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987). Certiorari was granted on Dec. 15, 1986. 107 S. Ct. 666
(1986).
88. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 319.
89. Id. at 320.
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The Court found that the Journal's interest in the confidential
business information and the timing of its release was a property right. 9°
The Court's finding that this was a property right is consistent with
long-standing jurisprudence. 91 The fact that the Journal suffered no
monetary loss was no defense, as it was enough that the Journal was
deprived of its right to the exclusive use of the information.9 2
The case is more significant in its recognition that a breach of a
fiduciary duty is fraud within the mail fraud statute if it results in a
transfer of something of economic value. The Court found that Winans'
promise not to reveal information prior to publication "became a sham
when in violation of his duty he passed along to his co-conspirators
confidential information belonging to the Journal." 93 The Court stated
that this is a well recognized proposition with similar prohibitions at
the common law.94
Since McNally was decided, there have been numerous decisions by
the lower federal courts applying McNally. Three of these offer some
guidance as to what courts and prosecutors may do in the future.
Ingber v. Enzor,95 involved a scheme whereby the defendant, Brian
Ingber, falsified absentee ballots to get himself elected to the office of
town supervisor. The jury was instructed that "(1) to defraud the public
of the intangible right to honest elections, or (2) to obtain 'money or
property,-specifically, the salary-powers and privileges of the Office
of Supervisor' by false pretenses" would constitute a mail fraud vio-
lation. 96 The jury found Ingber guilty. The court overturned the con-
90. Id. at 320-21.
91. The Court relied on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-04, 104
S. Ct. 2862, 2872-74 (1984); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10, 103 S. Ct. 3255,
3260 n.10 (1983); International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236, 39
S. Ct. 68, 71 (1918); and Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236,
250-51, 25 S. Ct. 637, 639-40 (1905). See also United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12,
19 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983); United States v.
Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998, 101 S. Ct. 1703
(1981); and United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1387-88 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 896, 99 S. Ct. 257 (1978).
92. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 320-21.
93. Id. at 321.
94. Id.
95. 664 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Ingber involved an action brought under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1982). This allows a prisoner to attack a conviction obtained in violation
of the United States Constitution or laws of the United States. As in Ingber, many of
these actions will succeed where the jury charge allows a conviction only for a deprivation
of honest and faithful services, even though the defendant's conduct may be proscribed
under the mail fraud statute after McNally. Since the jury possibly could convict the
defendant for conduct that is not proscribed, the judge will have to reverse the conviction,
though he may order a new trial.
96. Ingber, 664 F. Supp. at 820.
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viction, since the first charge allowed an impermissible conviction under
McNally. Nonetheless, the court went on to discuss whether the second
charge would fall within McNally, concluding that it did not.
The court reasoned that since the Supervisor's salary had to be
paid, the town suffered no loss of money or property. The court relied
on language in McNally which stated that the Commonwealth suffered
no loss as the insurance premiums would have been paid to some agency.
The Ingber court felt that before Ingber could be found guilty, the jury
would have to find that the town would not have paid the salary but
for the fraudulent scheme. Since the salary would have to be paid to
someone, there was no deprivation of money or property.
Ingber was also convicted under the mail fraud statue for using his
position as town supervisor to obtain a sewer contract for a company
his father and brother owned and in which he was an officer. Ingber
caused contract payments to be issued earlier and in larger amounts
than were otherwise normal, The court labeled the transactions as a
loss to the town, interpreting McNally to require that a loss be shown.
Arguably, there was a loss to the townn, 97 but it would have been more
correct to say that the town had been deprived of its right to control
the issuance of the payments.
In McNally a conviction would have been proper had the Com-
monwealth made it illegal for public officials to have an ownership
interest in agencies to which commissions from Commonwealth insurance
premiums were paid. In Ingher, had the town not had normal procedures
for issuing payments, it is questionable whether a conviction could stand.
Since there were specific procedures for issuing the payments which
Ingber did not follow, it was beyond question that the city had been
deprived of its right to control the expenditure of its funds.
United States v. Herrona" involved two defendants, Johannes Faul
and Claudy Herron. Faul, a financial consultant, was contacted by an
Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) informant to help the informant launder
$1,000,000. Banks are required to file a Currency Transaction Report
(CTR) on deposits of cash exceeding $10,000. The informant represented
the money as being legally obtained from a high-tech bean-sprout farm.
The informant told Faul he had not paid taxes on the money, and
wished to deposit the money in a bank while avoiding discovery by the
97. For example, if the town had placed its surplus funds in an interest bearing
account, it would have suffered a loss of interest by making the payments earlier. Absent
some interest bearing account, the town would have only been deprived of control over
the money, as presumably, they would have contracted with someone else to perform the
sewer contract.
98. 825 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1987).
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Treasury Department. Faul was to receive a percentage of the total cash
involved for his efforts.
Faul contacted Herron to arrange the deal, and Herron arranged
to have the money shipped overseas to be deposited into a Swiss bank.
The bank was then to wire the money back in the form of loans or
certified checks and deposit the money in a United States bank, thereby
avoiding the CTR requirement. After a jury trial, Herron was found
guilty of one count of wire fraud, 99 and Faul of three counts. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in a decision
rendered before McNally.00
The prosecution's theory was that the defendants had defrauded the
Treasury Department and the I.R.S. out of information which is normally
contained in a CTR form. Based upon McNally, the court granted a
rehearing.
The court held that the economic requirement imposed by McNally
had not been met, noting that in United States v. Richter'0' the Seventh
Circuit held that the information contained in the CTR was an "in-
tangible" benefit.' 0 2 The Herron court found that "the government had
no proprietary interest in the CTR information."'0 3 Since McNally re-
quires a deprivation of a money or property right, the conviction had
to be reversed.
The court briefly discussed whether the defendant's scheme was
designed to defraud the government out of taxes,104 under the theory
that the ultimate goal of a money laundering scheme is to deprive the
government of tax revenue. The court rejected that theory because the
indictment did not allege the existence of such a scheme.'0 5 However,
the court noted: "Certainly a scheme to defraud the United States of
99. The substantive law for wire fraud is the same as mail fraud. United States v.
Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 763 n.1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939, 104 S. Ct. 352
(1983).
100. Herron, 816 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing, 825 F.2d 50 (1987).
101. 610 F. Supp. 480 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd sub nom, United States v. Mangovski,
785 F.2d 312 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 191 (1986).
102. Herron, 825 F.2d at 56.
103. Id. at 57.
104. In United States v. Gimbel, 632 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. Wis. 1985), rev'd, 830 F.2d
621 (7th Cir. 1987), the trial court held that a scheme to avoid the filing of a CTR was
a scheme to deprive the government of taxes, since the ultimate goal of a money laundering
scheme was to avoid paying taxes. Relying upon McNally, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed. The Gimble court held that the indictment did not allege a scheme to
defraud the government of money or property, therefore, the conviction had to be reversed.
The court did not reach the issue of whether a scheme to deprive the government of tax
dollars is an offense under the mail fraud statute. Gimbel at 627 n.3.
105. Herron, 825 F.2d at 56.
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taxes would meet the 'money or property' requirement of McNally. ' ' 1°6
In United States v. Bucey,10 7 the court found that a scheme to
defraud the United States government of tax dollars is within the scope
of the mail fraud statute. As in Herron, the defendants failed to report
CTR information. The indictment in Bucey, however, charged that the
defendants schemed "to defraud the United States of money and prop-
erty, that is, income taxes." The court found that the government has
a property right in tax revenues on the date that they accrue.10 s
Both the Bucey and Herron courts were correct in concluding that
a scheme to defraud the government of tax dollars is within the mail
fraud statute; neither is the first case to make such a finding.' 9 The
government does have a property right in taxes; a taxpayer's scheme to
avoid paying that tax deprives the government of its tax dollars. The
Herron court only reversed the conviction because the indictment alleged
a deprivation of information. Had it alleged a scheme to defraud the
government of tax dollars, the conviction would have stood..
The Herron court also stated that the correct result had been reached
in United States v. Fagan,"0 handed down three days after the McNally
decision. Fagan involved a typical kickback scheme where Fagan paid
an employee bribes so that the employee's company could use Fagan's
boats to ferry its crews and equipment to drilling platforms. Fagan was
convicted under the mail fraud statute under the theory that a violation
occurs when an employee "violates his duty to disclose to his employer
economically material information which the 'employee has reason to
believe .. .would lead a reasonable employer to change its business
conduct.""" The Fagan court's only recognition of McNally was in a
footnote." 2 Even though most of the opinion had been written prior to
McNally, the court felt that the economic requirement had been met." 3
106. Id.
107. No. 86 CR 644 (N.D. 111. Jan. 4, 1988).
108. The Bucey court cited Manning v. Seely Tube and Bay Co. for this proposition.
338 U.S. 561, 566, 70 S. Ct. 388, 389 (1950). The Bucey court relied on United States
v. Keltner, 675 F.2d 602, 604 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982) to say that
the right to taxes accrues at the end of the tax year.
109. See United States v. Melvin, 544 F.2d 767 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910,
97 S. Ct. 1184 (1977); United States v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 973, 95 S. Ct. 1395 (1975), and United States v. Flaxman, 495 F.2d
344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 512, 95 S. Ct. 512 (1974).
110. 821 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1987).
111. Id. at 1009 (quoting United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), as
modified on reh'g, 680 F.2d 352 (1982)).
112. Id. at 1010 n.6.
113. Id. The Court primarily relied upon United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827, 94 S. Ct. 49 (1973), which held that a kickback scheme
deprived the employer of the amount of the kickback since the supplier would have
discounted hii merchandise by that amount.
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The Fagan court is undoubtedly correct in its conclusion, especially
in light of the Carpenter decision. The Fagan court found that the
employer was deprived of its control over its money. Justice Stevens,
in his dissent, offered some guidance as to when a kickback would fit
the "money or property" requirement of McNally. He states, "when a
person is being paid a salary for his loyal services, any breach of that
loyalty would appear to carry with it some loss of money to the employer
who is not getting what he paid for."11 4 He also relied on the Restatement
(Second) of Agency to say that "[ilf an agent receives anything as a
result of his violation of a duty of loyalty to the principal he is subject
to liability to deliver it, its value or its proceeds to the principal."" 5
Since the employer is entitled to the kickback, the employer is deprived
of the kickback, thereby satisfying the "money or property" requirement
of McNally.
In cases where an individual gives a kickback to the employee to
obtain a product or service from the employer, the employer is defrauded
of that product or service. The employer is defrauded because of the
breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the employee, a breach which
induces the employer to transfer the product or service to the individual.
Conceptually, the more difficult case arises where the individual
gives a kickback to an employee to get the employer to buy a product
or service from the individual. The Fellon Court addressed the problem,
concluding that the mail fraud statute was violated. This result would
be upheld by the Supreme Court, as the language used in the McNally
opinion suggests that such a result is correct." 6
CONCLUSION
Even though the legislative history is brief, there is no doubt that
the federal mail fraud statute was originally passed to protect against
fraudulent schemes involving property. The statute had always been
interpreted as such until the creation of the intangible rights doctrine.
The development of the intangible rights doctrine Started out on sound
footing by using a breach of a fiduciary duty to meet the mail fraud
statute's deception requirement, but slipped when it began to protect
intangible non-economic rights.
The McNally decision simply eliminates the statute's application to
intangible rights, returning the scope of the mail fraud statute to what
114. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2890 n.10.
115. Id,
116. As noted earlier, had the Commonwealth been deprived of control over the
expenditure of its money, a conviction in McNally would have been proper See supra
text accompanying notes 22 and 23.
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Congress originally contemplated-frauds involving the transfer of some-
thing of economic value. A fiduciary violation will support a mail fraud
conviction if there has been a transfer of something of economic value.
A fiduciary violation, by itself, will no longer support a conviction.
In determining whether there has been a deprivation of a property
right, guidance can be found in cases interpreting the modern theft
statutes and the crime of false pretenses, as well as those federal cases
involving the transfer of property which do not require that the victim
suffer a loss in order to be convicted of mail fraud.
McNally will slow the prosecution's use of the mail fraud statute,
but its greatest impact will be on the theory prosecutors will use in
obtaining mail fraud convictions. They will argue that the victim was
deprived of some economic interest, and therefore was deprived of
property. Carpenter, Herron, and Bucey illustrate the creative economic
theories that will be developed and used.
Congress could easily reinstate the intangible rights doctrine by
amending the mail fraud statute.' 7 Justice Holmes in Badders v. United
States"'8 wrote: "Whatever the limits to its [the mail fraud statute's]
power, it may forbid any such acts done in furtherance of a scheme
that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the
scheme or not."" 9 But until Congress amends the statute, the procrustean
bed will do no more stretching.
Paul W. Barnett
117. The meaning of fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) includes intangible rights
having no proprietary interest. It proscribes a conspiracy "to defraud the United States,
or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose." In a footnote to the McNally
opinion, the Court indicates this meaning will not change. The Court stated that § 371
proscribes conduct other than that directed at property rights because the statute's object
is to protect the welfare of the government alone. The mail fraud statute exists to protect
individual property rights. 107 S. Ct. at 2881 n.8. It would seem then that Congress
could amend the mail fraud statute to protect intangible rights that are not property
rights.
At the time of this writing, two bills have been introduced into Congress to overrule
McNally. H.R. 3089, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) would amend the mail fraud statute
to cover a loss of any intangible right. H.R. 3050, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) would
protect the public's "right to the conscientious, loyal, faithful, disinterested and unbiased
performance of official duties by a public official." See Moss, Bills Target McNally, 73
A.B.A. J. 34, Dec. 1, 1987, at 34.
118. 240 U.S. 391, 36 S. Ct. 367 (1916).
119. Id. at 393, 36 S. Ct. at 368.
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